Radical rethink of British operations is long overdue

These are grim and testing days for British troops in Afghanistan, and the Afghan people. And they are likely to get grimmer over the rest of this week, which the Taliban have chosen for their major offensive to disrupt Thursday's presidential and provincial elections.

Taliban skills in guerrilla warfare have shown startling improvement in the past three years. They have perfected a deadly tactic in the buried roadside bomb and they know how to coordinate fire, by attacking from the front while manoeuvring to attack from the flanks.

The Taliban offensive is a severe test for the international mission but it is not a question of make or break, or cut and run. The mission itself is as valid as the day it was launched - to bring secure government to the Afghans, and to deny vital space to the Taliban and their jihadist comrades in a loose alliance of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Lashkar e Taiba, who were behind last year's Bombay attack.

But the British losses in Helmand suggest a radical reappraisal of how the UK and its allies operate is long overdue. Perhaps there should be a senior British commander on the spot to take command of the UK effort for up to two years - at present we have a lieutenant general serving as titular deputy to the American commander but with little influence over British forces in Helmand.

Gordon Brown must seriously consider a surge of 2,000 more troops for the next year. More troops are needed to hold the parts of Helmand recently taken from the Taliban and to train the rapidly improving Afghan army and much weaker national police force.

British troops are engaged in a real war, and it requires a real national effort to sustain it. Unlike Iraq this is not a question of doing military favours for the Americans. It is as vital for Britain as America not to leave a strategic vacuum in southern Afghanistan.