Files show early Falklands warning

12 April 2012

Defence chiefs warned seven years before the Falklands War that the islands would be almost impossible to defend in the event of an Argentine invasion, according to official papers made public.

Files released to the National Archives in Kew, west London, under the 30-year rule show that in 1975 Defence Secretary Roy Mason urged Prime Minister Harold Wilson to seek a "political solution" to the long-running dispute over the islands.

A Ministry of Defence briefing note from February 1975 warned that the problems of providing a force sufficient to defend the islands in the face of an invasion were "formidable".

While the garrison of 33 Royal Marines was considered sufficient to counter an "adventurist operation", a force of brigade group strength would be needed to repel a full-scale Argentinian invasion.

Although it was possible to send reinforcements by sea, the note said, such a move could provoke the Argentinians to mount an invasion before they could reach the islands. "The despatch of these reinforcements, unless it could be carried out covertly - and since we are required to inform Nato this would be difficult - could carry the risk of pre-emptive action on the part of the Argentinians," it warned.

Other options included mining the approaches to the capital Port Stanley, or stationing a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine off the islands as a deterrent to any invasion force. However the note warned that maintaining any of the increased deterrent measures for any length of time would impose "increased penalties" on British forces elsewhere - which they could ill-afford.

At the time, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan was launching an attempt to reach a "leaseback" agreement which would ultimately give the Argentinians sovereignty over the islands. The plan ultimately foundered on the opposition of the 1,900 islanders who were determined to remain under British sovereignty.

However, in a note to No 10, Mason's private secretary John Mayne stressed that if the Argentinians did capture the islands it would be a "major operation" to retake them because of the long distances involved and because British forces would be denied the use of ports and airfields in other South American countries.

"All this only serves to emphasise that in the last resort, the solution to the Falkland Islands dispute must be political rather than military," he wrote.

The following year, in February 1976, Wilson suggested sending a SAS team to strengthen the garrison, but this was quickly ruled out. "A small training team might be seen as a provocative step by the Argentines, while at the same time it would not provide a garrison strong enough to resist serious attack," the Foreign Office said.

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